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THE FAILURE OF BOWLES V. RUSSELL 
Scott Dodson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Last term was a banner year for the Court, deciding such important issues as the 
constitutionality of partial-birth abortions, 1 the standing of states to challenge the EPA's 
ability to regulate greenhouse gases,2 the constitutionality of racial preferences in 
schools,3 the free speech rights of students,4 and the constitutionality of campaign 
finance reforms,5 among others. 
Even the rather mundane world of civil procedure received a spark when the Court 
interred the famous statement by Conley v. Gibson6 "that a complaint should not be 
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."7 The 
culprit, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,8 has received significant attention, with 
commentators heavily critiquing or defending it and exploring its aftermath in 
provocative ways.9 
There is another civil procedure case, however, that, though outshone by the more 
high profile cases, is perhaps the most underrated case of the term. The scant attention it 
has received10 does not do it justice: Bowles v. Russell11 is critically important at the 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. I am grateful to Irma Russell, Len 
Strickman, and Erwin Chemerinsky for their encouragement in submitting this article to the Supreme Court 
Review Issue. Thanks also to Phil Pucillo for providing valuable comments on an earlier draft. 
I. Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
2. Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007). 
3. Parents Involved in Community Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). 
4. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
5. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
6. 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
7. I d. at 45-46 (citation omitted). 
8. 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
9. See e.g. Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards after Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Br. 
121 (2007); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice,_ F.R.D. _(forthcoming 
2008); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, _ B.C. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2008); Suja A. 
Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss is Now Unconstitutional, 92 Minn. L. Rev._ (forthcoming 2008). For a 
bibliography listing both articles and blog entries on Bell Atlantic, see Scott Dodson, PrawfsBlawg, The 
Mystery of Twombly Continues, http:l/prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2008/02/the-mystery-of.html 
(Feb. 5, 2008). 
10. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 42 (2007) 
[hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdictionality]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionality or Inequity, 102 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. Colloquy 64 (2007); E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The Worst Kind of 
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broadest level. 
In a nutshell, Bowles held that the time limit to file a civil notice of appeal is 
jurisdictional. 12 Perhaps that holding hardly seems remarkable. But in reaching it, the 
Court overstated the supporting precedent, inflated the jurisdictional importance of 
statutes, and undermined an important recent movement to clarify when a rule is 
jurisdictional and when it is not. 
This did not have to be. The Court missed a golden opportunity to chart a middle 
course-holding the rule mandatory but nonjurisdictional-that would have been more 
consistent with precedent while resolving the case on its narrowest grounds. In failing to 
do so, the Court leaves lower courts and litigants to wonder whether statutory limits in 
other areas can be waived or excused for equitable reasons, or whether they could come 
back to unravel the entire case for the first time on appeal. 
Part I has provided an overview of Bowles and some of its implications. Part II 
takes a close look at Bowles, its holding, and the reasoning it used to get there. 
Part III embarks on a critical analysis of Bowles encompassing three important 
flaws. First, the Court overstated the precedent supporting its decision. It relied upon 
cases of dubious or ambiguous support and it failed to acknowledge contrary cases. It 
also failed to put that precedent in context-as just one factor of a more holistic 
framework for resolving the difficult characterization issue it confronted. Second, the 
Court inflated the importance of a jurisdictional distinction between statutory limits and 
nonstatutory limits by suggesting that statutory limits are jurisdictional. That is simply 
not true as a general rule, and does not follow from the modest jurisdictional distinction 
between statutes and rules. And, third, the Court called into question-wrongly and 
unnecessarily-more recent precedent that attempted to develop a meaningful and 
principled framework for resolving difficult characterization issues. 
Part IV then proposes a better course that Bowles should have taken. 
Characterizing the deadline at issue as mandatory rather than jurisdictional would have 
provided at least two important benefits. First, it would have alleviated the criticisms of 
Bowles identified in Part III. And, second, it would have allowed the Court to decide the 
case on the narrowest grounds possible. 
Finally, Part V concludes with some thoughts about the effects that the Court's 
error may have on lower courts and litigants in future cases involving statutory limits. 
II. A CLOSE LOOK AT BOWLES 
Keith Bowles was convicted of murder and sentenced by an Ohio jury.13 After 
unsuccessfully appealing his conviction and sentence, he filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of his 
Deadline-Except for All Others, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 151 (2008); Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts 
on Jurisdictionality, the Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 164 (2008); 
Scott Dodson, Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. Colloquy 228 (2008). 
II. 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). 
12. /d. at 2362. 
13. /d. 
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confinement. 14 
The federal district court denied his petitiOn and entered final judgment. 15 
Because habeas proceedings are civil in nature, Bowles had thirty days to file a notice of 
appeal. 16 He failed to file a notice within that time limit. 17 
Instead, three months later, Bowles sought to reopen the time to file a notice of 
appeal, 18 as permitted by rule and statute. 19 The district court granted his request on 
February 10, 2004, and stated in the court order that Bowles had until February 27-
seventeen days-to file such a notice.20 The law, however, allowed the district court to 
reopen the time period only for fourteen days. 21 
Bowles then filed a notice of appeal on February 26, within the time granted by the 
district court but outside the time allowed by federal rule and statute.22 On appeal, the 
state argued that the notice was untimely and that the court of appeals therefore lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal.23 Bowles argued that the equitable "unique 
circumstances" doctrine applied to excuse his noncompliance.24 The court of appeals 
rejected that argument and held the time limit to be jurisdictional. 25 
The Supreme Court affirmed, in a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Thomas. The 
Court began by stating, "This Court has long held that the taking of an appeal within the 
prescribed time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional. "'26 The Court cited both decisions 
interpreting the time limit of an appeal from district courts to the courts of appeals27 and 
decisions interpreting the time limit of an appeal from the district courts to the U.S. 
Supreme Court prior to the creation of the courts of appeals.28 In light of this history, 
Bowles stated: "[I]t is indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been 
treated as jurisdictional in American law for well over a century."29 
Bowles did acknowledge that recent precedent had attempted to construct a 
principled framework for resolving the jurisdictional character of limits,30 but it treated 
those decisions as drawing a distinction between limits contained in court rules and 
14. /d. 
15. /d. 
16. Bowles, 127 S, Ct. at 2362 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2006); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l)(A)). 
17. ld. 
18. /d. 
19. Jd. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)). 
20. /d. 
21. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)). 
22. Jd. 
23. /d. 
24. Jd. at 2366. 
25. /d. at 2362-63; see also Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366 ("Today we make clear that the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement."). 
26. /d. at 2363 (citing Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam)). 
27. See id. at 2363-64 (citing Hahn v. U.S., 524 U.S. 236, 247 (1998); Browder v. Dept. of Corrects., 434 
u.s. 257,264 (1978)). 
28. /d. at 2364 (citing Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U.S. 567, 568 (1883); U.S. v. Curry, 47 U.S. 106, 113 
(1848)). 
29. Jd. at 2363-64 n. 2; see also Bowles, 127 S. Ct. 2362 ("We have long and repeatedly held that the time 
limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in nature."). 
30. Jd. at 2364-65. 
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limits prescribed by statute.31 Bowles repeatedly proclaimed the "jurisdictional 
significance" of a statutory basis for a limit,32 citing to its own certiorari practice for 
support.33 "Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense," Bowles 
asserted, because only "Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction 
to consider."34 
Having resolved the time limit to be jurisdictional, Bowles concluded that "[t]he 
resolution of this case follows naturally."35 Bowles' noncompliance with the time limit 
"deprived the Court of Appeals of jurisdiction,"36 and, because the limit was 
jurisdictional, no equitable excuses, such as the "unique circumstances" doctrine could 
apply.37 
III. A CRJTICAL APPRAISAL OF BOWLES 
Bowles went wrong on several fronts. First, it overstated the precedential support. 
Second, it assumed a logical fallacy in the distinction between statutes and court rules. 
And, third, it created doctrinal tension with recent precedent tending to characterize such 
limits as nonjurisdictional. 
A. The False Simplicity of Stare Decisis 
As noted above, Bowles relied heavily--even dispositively38--on its view that the 
Court previously has held, consistently and for many years, that the time to file an appeal 
was a jurisdictional requirement. 39 At the outset, Bowles expressly said, "We have long 
and repeatedly held that the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional in 
nature."40 The Court then asserted that "[t]his Court has long held that the taking of an 
appeal within the prescribed time is 'mandatory and jurisdictional. "'41 The Court stated 
later, "it is indisputable that time limits for filing a notice of appeal have been treated as 
jurisdictional in American law for well over a century."42 Bowles characterized the 
31. !d. 
32. !d. at 2364; see also id. at 2365 (asserting a "jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules 
and limits enacted by Congress"). 
33. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365 (noting that the time limit for certiorari in civil cases, which is prescribed by 
statute, had been termed "jurisdictional," see FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 90 (1994), 
whereas the same non-statutory time limit for certiorari in criminal cases is not, see Schacht v. U.S., 398 U.S. 
58, 64 (I 970)). 
34. !d. at 2365. 
35. !d. at 2366. 
36. /d. 
37. /d. ("Because this Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, 
use of the 'unique circumstances' doctrine is illegitimate."). Indeed, the Court overruled two prior cases that 
applied the exception. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366 (overruling Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964) (per 
curiam); Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215 (1962) (per curiam)). 
38. /d. at 2363-64 n. 2 ("Given the choice between calling into question some dicta in our recent opinions 
and effectively overruling a century's worth of practice, we think the former option is the only prudent 
course."). 
39. See supra nn. 26--29. 
40. 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
41. /d. at 2363 (quoting Griggs, 459 U.S. at 61). 
42. !d. at 2363-64 n. 2. 
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"longstanding treatment'43 as a "consistency of this Court's holdings'44 and stated that a 
contrary decision would amount to the "repudiation of a century's worth of precedent ... 
effectively overruling" it.45 
The precedent is not as clear as Bowles's characterizations of it make it seem. Two 
cases cited by Bowles did not even address the characterization of a tardy appeal. The 
other ·cases did, but their characterizations were unnecessary because their facts 
supported the narrower ground of a mandatory characterization. And other cases, not 
cited by Bowles, tend to undermine the conclusion that appeal time limits are 
jurisdictional. As a result, Bowles's reliance on precedent as a justification is highly 
questionable. 
1. Precedent Failing to Address the Issue 
Bowles relied on Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co. 46 and Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Discount Co}7 neither of which addressed time limits for appeals. 
Torres held that the failure to specify a party in the notice of appeal renders the 
appellate court without jurisdiction over that party.48 Such an omission constitutes a 
failure of that party to appeal at al1.49 The Court did not hold that the time limit for filing 
a notice of appeal was jurisdictional; rather, it held that the failure to appeal at all 
deprived the appellate court of jurisdiction. 5° 
Griggs also addressed the effect of failing to file any effective notice of appeal 
rather than addressing the time limit to appeal. There, the district court granted summary 
judgment and entered an order on November 5, 1981, that judgment be entered.51 On 
November 12, the respondent filed a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment under 
Rule 59.52 While that motion was pending, the respondent filed a premature notice of 
appeal. 53 The district court denied the motion, but no other notice of appeal was filed. 54 
The petitioners immediately contested the jurisdiction of the appellate court by arguing 
that the notice of appeal was insufficient. 55 The Court concluded that a premature notice 
of appeal was a "nullity ... as if no notice of appeal [was] filed at all. "56 
Both Torres and Griggs hold that the event of filing a notice of appeal is a 
jurisdictional prerequisite; 57 they say nothing about the jurisdictional significance of the 
time limits to file a notice of appeal. 
43. /d. at 2364. 
44. /d. 
45. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2364 n. 2. 
46. 487 U.S. 312 (1988). 
47. 459 U.S. 56 (1982) (per curiam). 
48. 487 U.S. at 314. 
49. /d. 
50. /d. at 317-18. 





56. Griggs, 459 U.S. at 61. 
57. /d. at 61 ("[I]fno notice of appeal is filed at all, the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to act."). 
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A third case Bowles cited is Hohn v. United States,58 but that case is even further 
removed from the issue. The question in that case was "whether the Court has 
jurisdiction to review decisions of the courts of appeals denying applications for 
certificates of appealability."59 Hohn was convicted of use of a firearm during a drug 
trafficking offense.60 He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was 
denied.61 He then filed a notice of appeal in the court of appeals, which treated the 
notice as an application for a certificate of appealability, which was a precondition to an 
appeal required by statute. 62 The court of appeals denied the certificate. 63 
Hohn then sought certiorari review of that denial in the U.S. Supreme Court.64 
The Court questioned its own appellate jurisdiction, for the statute authorized the Court 
to hear "[ c ]ases in the courts of appeals," and it was unclear whether an application for a 
certificate of appealability was a "case" that was "in" the court of appeals.65 
In the context of a variety of arguments, the Court reasoned that even if the court 
of appeals as a court improperly considered the application for a certificate (because only 
a "circuit judge[ ]"66 could grant the certificate), the Supreme Court nevertheless had 
exercised jurisdiction in analogous cases, such as over appeals when the appellate court 
dismissed for want ofjurisdiction.67 Citing Torres and United States v. Robinson, whose 
characterization of the time limit to appeal a criminal case as "mandatory and 
jurisdictional"68 has since been disavowed,69 the Court repeated the mantra that "[t]he 
filing of a proper notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional."70 But the argument 
was by analogy and hardly critical to the outcome, which did not tum on the 
characterization of the timely filing of a notice of appeal in any way. Hahn's reference 
to the jurisdictional character of the "filing of a proper notice of appeal" is best seen as 
an unexamined and tangential point that itself relies on cases that do not support it. 
2. Overbroad Precedent 
The other three cases cited by Bowles did use the word "jurisdictional" to describe 
the time limit for taking an appeal. But each case could have been decided on far 
narrower nonjurisdictional grounds-namely, that the limit was a mandatory limit 
properly invoked by the appellee and immune to equitable excuses-and nothing in the 
reasoning or facts suggested that the blunter characterization was warranted?' The 
58. 524 u.s. 236 (1998). 
59. /d. at 238-39. 
60. /d. 
61. /d. 
62. /d. at 240. 
63. Hahn, 524 at 240. 
64. I d. 
65. /d. at 241--42 (citation omitted). 
66. /d. at 245. 
67. /d. at 246--47. 
68. 361 u.s. 220,229 (1960). 
69. See Eberhart v. U.S., 546 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2005) (interpreting Robinson's phrase "mandatory and 
jurisdictional" to mean "emphatic time prescriptions" but nonjurisdictional). 
70. Hahn, 425 U.S. at 247. 
71. See Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal imagination, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. I, 51-52 (1994). 
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characterization of the limit as "jurisdictional" in each case was unnecessary dicta at best 
and careless use of the term at worst. 
For example, United States v. Curry72 dismissed an appeal for untimeliness and 
called it a dismissal for "want of jurisdiction,"73 but it was dismissed on the basis of a 
timely motion made by the appellee?4 The appellant tried to argue for an equitable 
excuse-that the order in the lower court was served on him late and that that was why 
his appeal was tardy-but the Court would have none of it, reasoning that the appeal 
deadline "is regulated by acts of Congress, which the court can neither change nor 
modify."75 Thus, the only question in Curry was whether the Court could excuse 
noncompliance for equitable reasons. 
Scarborough v. Pargoud also dismissed an appeal purportedly for lack of 
jurisdiction, 76 but the opinion is far from persuasive. The opinion does not state that the 
Court was raising the timeliness issue on its own motion or that the appellee had 
forfeited or attempted to waive the issue or that equitable excuses were considered and 
rejected. Nor does Scarborough set forth any principled rationale for holding the limit to 
be jurisdictional per se, as opposed to simply inflexible on the facts at issue in the case. 
Instead, the Court disposed of the appeal in summary disposition: "[T]he writ of error in 
this case was not brought within the time limited by law, and we have consequently no 
jurisdiction." 77 
Of course, both Curry and Scarborough were decided before 28 U.S.C. § 2701 was 
enacted in 1948. Indeed, both were decided before the U.S. courts of appeals were 
created in 1891. Curry was an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court from a federal district 
court, and Scarborough was an appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court from a state court. 
The one case Bowles cites that did address § 2107 is Browder v. Department of 
Corrections, in which the Court stated that the time limit was "mandatory and 
jurisdictional,"78 again borrowing that phrase from the now-discredited Robinson.79 But 
Browder had no need to appropriate that unfortunate doublet anyway, for the question in 
Browder was whether an untimely motion for a hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding-
As used in the phrase "jurisdictional time limit," the word [jurisdictional] might just mean "literal" 
or "unqualified" or "peremptory" or some such thing. And that definition might be distinct from the 
sense of the work in the doctrines associated with the Idea of Jurisdiction. A time limit could be 
"jurisdictional" in the sense of being literal or peremptory whether or not it was jurisdictional in the 
general sense, and vice versa. 
!d. (emphasis omitted); Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 399,410 
(1986) ("In each instance where the Supreme Court has referred to the thirty-day appeal period as 'mandatory 
and jurisdictional,' it might have simply said 'mandatory,' for the only issue was whether the court of appeals 
had authority to relax the exact requirements of Rule 4(a)."). 
72. 47 U.S. 106 (1848). 
73. !d. at 113. 
74. !d. at 109. 
75. !d. at 112. 
76. 108 U.S. 567, 586 (1883). 
77. !d. I have found one additional case (not cited by Bowles) similar to Scarborough, in which the Court 
summarily dismissed an untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction and in which it is unclear whether the appellee 
objected or moved to dismiss the appeal. See Credit Co. v Ark. C. Ry. Co., 128 U.S. 258 (1888). Like 
Scarborough, this case also antedated the creation of the courts of appeals. 
78. 434 U.S. 257,264 (1978). 
79. See supra text accompanying nn. 69-70. 
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timely objected to by the habeas petitioner at each point in the proceedings-tolled the 
time to appeal the district court's judgment.80 The Court agreed with the petitioner and 
stated that the appellate court lackedjurisdiction,81 but it needed only have gone so far as 
to resolve a simple equitable tolling issue, not whether the time limit was jurisdictional. 
These cases illustrate what I and others have exposed as a careless conflation of the 
jurisdictional moniker and a mandatory rule. 82 Each case could have been supported on 
the narrow grounds of a mandatory characterization without involving the broader (and 
even more difficult) question of whether the rule was also jurisdictional. None gave any 
normative or principled reason why the time limit should be jurisdictional as opposed to 
merely mandatory. Accordingly, they need not have commanded the weight that Bowles 
cited and relied upon.83 
3. Contrary Precedent 
Bowles also characterized the precedent holding the time limits to file a notice of 
appeal as "consistent[ ]."84 In reality, the precedent is ambiguous. 
At least one case is fairly characterized as contrary to the precedent relied upon by 
Bowles. In United Public Workers of America v. Mitchel/,85 the judgment of the district 
court was entered on September 26, 1944, and an order was entered a month later, on 
October 26, allowing an appeal. 86 The statute provided that the record had to be 
docketed in the Supreme Court within sixty days,87 but the appeal was not docketed until 
February 2, 1945, outside of the sixty-day period.88 The Government moved to dismiss 
the appeal on that basis. 89 The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the statutory 
deadline to docket appeals in the Supreme Court was nonjurisdictional: "We do not 
construe the requirement of docketing within sixty days as a limitation on our power to 
hear this appeal."90 
Other cases, though not specifically addressing the time to file a civil appeal, 
nevertheless deal with issues sufficiently related that they undermine the consistency 
80. See 434 U.S. at 261-63. 
81. !d. at 264-65, 267. 
82. See e.g. Dane, supra n. 71, at 39 (describing the phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional" as "one of those 
standard doubles ('null and void,' 'cease and desist') that so fill legal poetics. But there is less to this than one 
might think. First, legal rules can be mandatory without being jurisdictional."); Dodson, Jurisdictionality, 
supra n. 10, at 46-47; Hall, supra n. 71, at 409 ("'[M]andatory and jurisdictional' ... is merely a technique for 
emphasizing the strict enforcement of the mandatory terms of Rule 4(a). It does not sanctity timing 
requirements so as to require them to be noticed sua sponte."). 
83. I do not mean to imply that these cases did not treat the deadline as jurisdictional. Those courts no 
doubt meant what they said. My point, however, is that those courts made a characterization that was 
overbroad and largely unnecessary, and therefore they may be reformed through the lens of more recent 
caselaw that attempt to resolve jurisdictional characterization questions on a more principled basis. See infra 
text accompanying nn. 143-55. 
84. 127 S. Ct. at 2364. 
85. 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
86. !d. at 84. 
87. !d. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 380a (1945)). 
88. !d. 
89. !d. 
90. Mitchell, 330 U.S. at 86. 
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relied upon by Bowles. For example, Foman v. Davis91 held that the failure in the notice 
to specify what judgment the appeal was taken from-a requirement under Rule 392 -is 
a nonjurisdictional defect. 93 That is important because the Court has "clarifl:ied] [that 
Rules 3 and 4] are indeed linked jurisdictional provisions."94 Similarly, Becker v. 
Montgomery95 held that the failure of an appellant to sign the notice of appeal-a 
requirement of Rule 11-is a nonjurisdictional defect.96 Finally, in Eberhart v. United 
States,97 the Court reinterpreted Robinson-which had characterized the time to file a 
criminal appeal as "mandatory and jurisdictional"98 -as a decision merely invoking the 
mandatory and inflexible nature of the rule.99 
These cases undermine Bowles's assertion that the precedent interpreting time 
limits for filing civil appeals universally supports a jurisdictional characterization. 
B. The Misguided Link between Statutes and Jurisdictionality 
In addition to overstating the value of precedent to its result, Bowles relied on a 
logical flaw in reasoning. Bowles overinflated a distinction between deadlines contained 
in court rules and deadlines prescribed by statute. 100 Bowles repeatedly proclaimed the 
'jurisdictional significance" of a statutory basis for a deadline, 101 citing to its own 
certiorari practice for support. 102 Bowles asserted that "[j]urisdictional treatment of 
statutory time limits makes good sense" because only "Congress decides what cases the 
federal courts have jurisdiction to consider."103 
Bowles is correct that there is a jurisdictional significance to the source of the 
deadline, but it does not lead to Bowles's conclusion. The jurisdictional significance is 
that if a deadline is nonstatutory, it almost certainly is nonjurisdictional. But that does 
not mean, as Bowles implies, that all statutory rules are (or even are presumptively) 
jurisdictional. In truth, statutory rules can be jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional, and the 
mere fact that they are statutory does not resolve the characterization issue. 
91. 371 U.S. 178 (1962). 
92. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(l). 
93. Farnan, 371 U.S. at 180-81. 
94. Beckerv. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757,765 (2001). 
95. !d. 
96. !d. at 765. 
97. 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (per curiam). 
98. Robinson, 361 U.S. at 228-29. 
99. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17-18 (interpreting Robinson's phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional" to mean 
emphatically mandatory but non jurisdictional). 
I 00. 127 S. Ct. at 2364. 
101. !d.; see also id. at 2365 (asserting a "jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and 
limits enacted by Congress"). 
I 02. !d. at 2365 (noting that the time limit for certiorari in civil cases, which is prescribed by statute, had 
been termed "jurisdictional," see FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 90 (1994), whereas the 
same non-statutory time limit for certiorari in criminal cases is not, see Schacht v. U.S., 398 U.S. 58, 90 
(1970)). 
103. !d. The Court never addressed-and never confronted-the fact that§ 2107 was amended to conform 
to the preexisting Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. In other words, for a period of time, the 
authorization (and restrictions on that authorization) of a court to extend the deadline to file a notice of appeal 
in a civil case was governed solely by federal rule rather than by statute. See Statutory Time Limits to Appeal, 
121 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 322-24 (2007). For an interesting admission of this error, see Transcr. of Oral 
Argument, John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. U.S., 128 S. Ct. 750 (2008). 
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The jurisdictional significance of the dichotomy begins with nonstatutory rules. 
Only Congress may limit a lower court's subject-matter jurisdiction. 104 In light of that, 
the Rules Enabling Act provides that the Court may create "rules of practice and 
procedure,"105 not rules limiting or expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Indeed, the Court itself has stated that "it is axiomatic" that such rules "do not create or 
withdraw federal jurisdiction."106 In most cases, the rule schema make this explicit, 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure disavowing any attempt to "extend or limit the jurisdiction" of the courts. 1 07 
Even the Court's own rules are not jurisdictionai. 108 The upshot to all this is that a 
nonstatutory rule has a difficult row to hoe before it can be called jurisdictional. 
But the fact that nonstatutory rules are highly unlikely to be jurisdictional does not 
mean that all statutory rules are (or even are highly likely to be) jurisdictional. In 
contrast to the strong presumption that nonstatutory rules are not jurisdictional, statutory 
rules can go either way. Indeed, a number of statutory limits are nonjurisdictional. For 
example, Title VII's time limit to file a complaint109 is a nonjurisdictional statutory 
requirement. 110 And the statutory requirement that a removal petition be filed within a 
specific time 111 has repeatedly been held to be nonjurisdictional. 112 And, finally, federal 
statutes of limitations have long been held to be nonjurisdictional. 113 Thus, the fact that 
a deadline is statutory does not mean it is jurisdictional. 
I 04. See U.S. Const. art. III, § I. 
105. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. 
106. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,370 (1978); see also Schacht, 398 U.S. at 63-64. 
We cannot accept the view that ... [Supreme Court Rule 22(2)'s] time requirement is jurisdictional 
and cannot be waived by the Court. [The rule] contains no language that calls for so harsh an 
interpretation, and it must be remembered that this rule was not enacted by Congress but was 
promulgated by this Court under authority of Congress to prescribe rules concerning the time 
limitations for taking appeals and applying for certiorari in criminal cases. . . . The procedural rules 
adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its business are not jurisdictional and can be 
relaxed by the Court in the exercise of its discretion when the ends of justice so require. 
!d.; Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. I, 10 (1941) (observing that court rules cannot extend or restrict the 
jurisdiction conferred by statute). 
107. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9030; Fed. R. Civ. P. 82; cf Fed. R. Crim. P. l(a)(l) ("These rules govern the 
procedure in all criminal proceedings in the [federal courts].") (emphasis added); Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 13 
(concluding partly on this basis that Rule 33 of the Federal Rules ofCrirninal Procedure is not jurisdictional). 
I 08. Schacht, 398 U.S. at 64 ("The procedural rules adopted by the Court for the orderly transaction of its 
business are not jurisdictional .... "). 
109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). 
110. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 394 (1982). 
Ill. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
112. See e.g. Ariel Land Owners, Inc. v. Dring, 351 F.3d 611,614-15 (3rd Cir. 2003); Barnes v. 
Westinghouse Electric. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1992); Wilson v. Gen. Motors Corp., 888 F.2d 779, 
781 (lith Cir. 1989); see also James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice vol. 16, § 107.4l[l][c][iv], 107-
197 (3d ed., Lex is 2007) (concluding that the better view is a non jurisdictional characterization); cf 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 n. 13 (1996). But see Smith v. MBL Life Assurance Corp., 727 F. 
Supp. 601, 602-03 (N.D. Ala. 1989) (holding the one-year limit for diversity removal to be jurisdictional); 
Perez v. Gen. Packer, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1464, 1470--71 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (same); Gray v. Moore Bus. Forms, 
Inc., 711 F. Supp. 543, 544--45 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (same); Brock v. Syntex Laboratories., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 721, 
723 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (same), aff'd, 7 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1993); Rashid v. Schenck Constr. Co., 843 F. Supp. 
1081, 1086-88 (S.D. W.Va. 1993) (same). 
113. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (characterizing statutes of limitations as waivable affirmative defenses); 
Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205 (2006); Irwin v. Dept. of Vets. Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 93-96 (1990); 
Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394. 
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It may be that Bowles was attempting not to create a rigid dichotomy between rules 
and statutes but instead to create a presumption of jurisdictionality when a deadline is set 
by statute. But there is no more reason to presume a deadline to be jurisdictional just 
because it is statutory than to hold a deadline to be jurisdictional just because it is 
statutory. 
In addition, there are two dangers to presuming jurisdictionality in the face of 
congressional silence on the matter. First, such a presumption conflicts with the Court's 
prior precedent establishing a presumption of nonjurisdictionality in the absence of a 
clear congressional statement of jurisdictionality. 114 Second, a jurisdictional rule often 
entails heavy costs on the litigants and legal system. 115 Presuming jurisdictionality from 
congressional silence risks incurring these costs without due consideration from 
Congress. 
C. Doctrinal Confusion 
In the process of oversimplifying precedent and making unjustified leaps of logic, 
Bowles trampled on recent precedent attempting to provide a principled framework for 
resolving what is jurisdictional and what is not. In dismissing it as "dicta,"116 or as 
limited to the precise facts before the Court at those times, 117 Bowles has undermined 
much of that sensible effort. 
Over the last few years, the Court has obsessed over jurisdictional characterization 
questions and bemoaned lower courts' and its own careless use of the term 
"jurisdictional."118 In response, the Court had begun to develop a core set ofprinciples 
to help distinguish between jurisdictional rules and non jurisdictional rules. For example, 
in the unanimous decision Kontrick v. Ryan, the Court stated: 
Clarity would be facilitated if courts and litigants used the label 'jurisdictional" not for 
claim-processing rules, but only for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-
matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's 
d . d" h . 119 a ~u 1catory aut onty. 
114. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006) ("[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory 
limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as non jurisdictional in character."). 
115. Because jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even obligates courts to monitor it sua sponte, a 
jurisdictional defect discovered well into the appeal can cause disruption, unfairness, and tremendous waste of 
time and resources. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 55,66 (2008). 
116. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2364 n. 2. 
117. !d. at 2365 (summarily distinguishing Arbaugh and Scarborough). 
118. /d. at 2363 n. 2 (criticizing "this Court's past careless use of [jurisdictional] terminology"). "This 
variety of [jurisdictional] meaning has insidiously tempted courts, this one included, to engage in less than 
meticulous, sometimes even profligate use of the term." /d. at 2367 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., 
dissenting) (internal quotation marks, citations, and ellipses omitted). Sinochem Inti. Co. v. Malay. Inti. Ship. 
Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2007) (admitting that phrases from prior precedent using the term "jurisdiction" 
were "less than felicitously crafted") (internal quotation marks omitted); Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 510 (confessing 
that federal courts, itself included, had "sometimes been profligate in its use of the term [jurisdictional]"); 
Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19 (noting that the lower court's improper characterization of a federal rule as 
jurisdictional "is an error shared among the circuits, and that it was caused in large part by imprecision in our 
prior cases"); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004) ("Courts, including this Court, it is true, have been 
less than meticulous ... they have more than occasionally used the term 'jurisdictional' to describe emphatic 
time prescriptions in rules of court."). 
119. 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). 
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In deciding that the time prescriptions at issue in Kontrick were forfeitable and 
nonjurisdictional, the Court looked to their "primary purposes" and found those to be 
claim-processing purposes: Informing the pleader of the time to file a complaint, 
instructing the court on the limits of its discretion to grant time enlargements, and 
affording an affirmative defense to a complaint filed outside the time limits. 120 The 
Court reaffirmed Kontrick the following year in the per curiam decision Eberhart, 121 
holding that the deadline at issue there was "[a] claim-processing rule[ ] ... [that] 
assure[s] relief to a party properly raising [it], but do[es] not compel the same result if 
the party forfeits [it]."122 
Kontrick did not end the framework's development. In Scarborough, the Court 
held that the statutory time limits on fee shifting under the Equal Access to Justice 
Act123 also were nonjurisdictional. 124 The Court held that the time period does not 
concern subject-matter jurisdiction; rather, "it concerns a mode of relief (costs including 
legal fees) ancillary to the judgment of a court that [already] has plenary jurisdiction."125 
The limit does not delineate classes of cases that the court is competent to adjudicate; it 
"relates only to post judgment proceedings auxiliary to cases already within that court's 
adjudicatory authority." 126 Thus, in Scarborough, the Court added another principle to 
its developing framework: That limits that affect only the mode of relief in a proceeding 
ancillary to a case already within the court's jurisdiction are non jurisdictional. 
Finally, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 127 the Court added new layers to the 
framework. The Court construed the employer-numerosity requirement of Title VII 128 
as a nonjurisdictional element of the merits rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. 129 
In resolving the characterization issue, the Court looked to the consequences of a 
jurisdictional characterization, including the burden on courts to police compliance sua 
sponte and the waste of resources if a jurisdictional defect is discovered late in the 
case. 130 Given the potential unfairness and waste of resources, the Court created a 
presumption of nonjurisdictionality: 
If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as 
jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle 
with the issue. . . . But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as 
jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. 131 
Thus, through Kontrick, Scarborough, Eberhart, and Arbaugh, the Court has made 
a concerted effort to dispense with careless and unexamined use of jurisdictional 
120. /d. at 456. 
121. 546 U.S. 12. 
122. /d. at 19. 
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(l)(A). 
124. 541 U.S. at 405. 
125. /d. at 413 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
126. /d. at414. 
127. 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
129. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. 
130. /d. at513-14. 
131. !d. at 515-16 (footnote omitted). 
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characterizations and to embark on a more principled approach. 
Bowles was undoubtedly correct when it distinguished these cases. Kontrick and 
Eberhart were perhaps easier cases than they made out because they addressed the 
characterization of nonstatutory court rules. Scarborough could be distinguished based 
on the peculiar statutory provision at issue-a fee-shifting requirement for a case already 
within federal jurisdiction. And Arbaugh deals with the characterization of statutory 
coverage-merits v. jurisdiction. 
But that does not mean, as Bowles seems to suggest, that these cases are irrelevant 
and unimportant beyond their facts. The principles they develop have equal value for the 
characterization of the kind of statutory time limit that Bowles confronted. 132 That these 
cases are distinguishable is no reason to dismiss out of hand the valuable characterization 
principles they develop. 
Yet by dismissing the importance of these cases, dispensing with their framework 
in favor of a new unitary reliance on precedent, and by overinflating the distinction 
between statutes and court rules, Bowles has called into question the entire framework 
these cases developed. After Bowles, it is unclear what survives from Kontrick and 
Eberhart besides their narrow holdings. Does Bowles suggest that the distinction 
between a claim-processing rule and a rule that separates classes of cases should be 
discarded in favor of a bright-line distinction between rules and statutes? Does Bowles 
suggest that, because the procedural provision in Scarborough was in a statute that 
Scarborough was wrongly decided (or at least wrongly reasoned)? And does Bowles 
suggest that Arbaugh's presumption of nonjurisdictionality for statutory questions is 
backwards? 
In short, Bowles calls the methodology and reasoning of each of these cases into 
doubt. The resulting doctrinal confusion that Bowles engenders is likely to create more 
work and uncertainty for litigants and lower courts whenever a characterization issue 
arises-which is likely to be quite often. 
IV. A BETTER APPROACH 
I have argued that Bowles overstated the applicable precedent, made a logical leap 
connecting statutes with jurisdictionality, and unnecessarily called into question more 
recent precedent and the salutary framework it had been developing. It did not have to 
be this way. Bowles could have alleviated each of these concerns and still reached the 
result that it did by holding the time limit to appeal to be nonjurisdictional but 
mandatory. 
A. A Nonjurisdictional Time to Appeal 
As I have suggested above, the weakness of the "longstanding treatment" Bowles 
relied upon, coupled with the more recent precedent trending away from rote 
jurisdictional characterizations, would have allowed Bowles to consider the 
jurisdictionality of the deadline to file a notice of appeal in a more principled way. 
132. See Dodson, supra n. 115, at 66-77. 
644 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:631 
Elsewhere and in a different context, I have proposed a principled framework for 
resolving whether a rule is jurisdictional or not. 133 At the outset, a court should consider 
whether Congress expressly designed the rule as jurisdictional. If so, then courts should 
presume the rule to be jurisdictional. If not, then courts should consider three other 
factors. 134 For § 2107, there is no clear statement of jurisdictionality. Congress used the 
word "shall," but nothing suggests that that word means "jurisdictional" as opposed to 
"mandatory." Thus, the presumption, in my view, is inapplicable, and the Court should 
have turned to other factors. 
First, courts should consider the functions of the rule. Does the rule separate 
classes of cases, or does the rule merely process claims and relate to modes of 
proceedings? Is the rule directed primarily at the power of the court and underlying 
societal values such as federalism, or is it directed at the rights, obligations, or 
conveniences of the parties? Based on the different natures of jurisdiction and 
procedure, a rule separating classes of cases or directed at the power of the court or 
underlying societal values serves jurisdictional purposes and, therefore, should support a 
jurisdictional characterization, whereas a rule regulating the process or mode of the case 
and directed to the rights and obligations of the parties serves procedural purposes. 135 
This factor might support a procedural characterization of the deadline to file an 
appeal because time limits to file a civil appeal are more likely to serve procedural rather 
than jurisdictional functions. The time limit is primarily for the benefit of the litigants-
providing notice of the appeal and discouraging appellate review of stale issues-not for 
broader societal interests. 136 In addition, the deadline applies to civil actions generally, 
and thus it is classified more properly as a claim-processing rule than as a rule that 
separates classes of cases. Finally, it is doubtful that the time limit to file a notice of 
appeal speaks to the power of the appellate court. A notice of appeal does shift authority 
from a district court to a court of appeals. 137 But that shift is triggered by the filing, not 
the timing, of the notice. There is no reason to think that the timing of the notice of 
appeal has any jurisdictional function. 
Second, courts should consider the effects of characterizing the rule as 
jurisdictional or procedural, such as (1) the burdens on courts to monitor compliance sua 
sponte, (2) the benefits of allowing parties to consent to noncompliance, (3) the burden 
on the appellee to discover and prove noncompliance, and (4) the resulting inefficiencies 
and equities of a particular characterization. 138 
On a quick analysis, this factor probably supports a nonjurisdictional 
characterization. The first and third effects cancel each other out. The burden on the 
133. !d. at 66-78. 
134. !d. at 66-71. 
135. !d. at 71-77. 
136. Hall, supra n. 71, at 399-400 ("[A]ppeal periods are like original jurisdiction limitations periods: they 
involve primarily the interests of the immediate parties, not fundamental societal interests."); Alex Lees, 
Student Author, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1457, 1496 (2006). 
137. See E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake ofKontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing 160 
Years of Precedent, 40 Creighton L. Rev. 181, 182 (2007) ("[Some deadlines] mark the beginning or ending of 
significant parts of litigation. Because of that, the law has long recognized that the goals of finality and 
evenhandedness do not allow these time limits to be extended by the parties or overlooked by the court."). 
138. Dodson, supra n. 115, at 77. 
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appellee to discover and prove noncompliance is relatively light, suggesting that the 
appellee would not need the unlimited time to discover the defect that a jurisdictional 
characterization would allow. On the other hand, the burden on the court to monitor 
compliance sua sponte also is relatively light because dates generally are counted easily 
and because any extension must be applied for by motion. 139 
But the second and fourth effects support a nonjurisdictional characterization. 
Allowing the appellee to be able to consent to an extension of the time to appeal allows 
the parties to choose to avoid litigating what constitutes "excusable neglect or good 
cause,"
140 
a determination that might otherwise be fact intensive, time consuming, and 
difficult for the court. Similarly, a jurisdictional characterization for a timing defect that 
happens to go unnoticed may ultimately unravel a fully-argued appeal, including even a 
rehearing and rehearing en bane, wasting litigant and judicial time and resources. On 
balance, this second factor probably supports a non jurisdictional characterization. 
And, third, courts should consider doctrinal and cross-doctrinal consistency. 141 
This factor probably either supports a jurisdictional characterization or is neutral. On the 
one hand, as discussed above, there is language in prior precedent, such as Curry, 
Scarborough, and Browder, that characterizes the time limit to file a notice of appeal in a 
civil case as jurisdictional. 142 On the other hand, in a broader context, that precedent is 
far from clear or consistent. 143 In addition, the treatment of a time limit to appeal as 
jurisdictional is in tension with the long tradition of characterizing statutes of limitations 
as nonjurisdictional. 144 Even if this factor supports a jurisdictional characterization, it 
probably is too weak to outweigh the other factors suggesting the deadline to be 
. . d' . 1145 nOnJUflS !ChOna . 
Thus, application of a holistic framework that considers more fully the factors 
relevant to jurisdictionality might well lead to a conclusion opposite that of Bowles-that 
the time to file a notice of appeal in a civil case is nonjurisdictional. But my broader 
criticism is that Bowles erred methodologically by failing to even engage in this more 
nuanced analysis. If the Court had been intent on resolving the jurisdictional question, it 
at least ought to have done so in a principled and thoughtful way. 
B. A Mandatory Time to Appeal 
Had Bowles considered the characterization issue more carefully, it might well 
have recognized that the result it reached did not require it to resolve the jurisdictional 
characterization anyway. A rule can be nonjurisdictional and yet still be "mandatory"-
unsusceptible to equitable excuses for noncompliance. 146 
139. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (conditioning extensions on the filing of a motion). 
140. Id. 
141. Dodson, supra n. 115, at 78-79. 
142. See supra text accompanying nn. 71-83. 
143. See supra text accompanying nn. 46-99. 
144. See e.g. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (characterizing statutes of limitations as waivable affirmative defenses); 
Day, 547 U.S. at 205; Irwin, 498 U.S. at 93-96; Zipes, 455 U.S. at 394. 
145. Dodson, supra n. 115, at 78 ("If the other factors discussed above strongly point to a characterization 
unsupported by an historical pedigree, then the historical pedigree should give way."). 
146. See Dodson, Jurisdictionality, supra n. 10, at 46-47; cf Lees, supra n. 136, at 1497 ("Courts can still 
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Characterizing the deadline to file a notice of appeal as mandatory rather than 
jurisdictional would have had at least two salutary effects. First, it would have been 
consistent with each line of precedent discussed above. Second, it would have given the 
Court a way to reach the same result in a far narrower way, without risking deciding 
other attributes of the deadline that were not technically presented to the Court. 
1. Consistency with Precedent 
As discussed above, Bowles relied on precedent that either is ambiguous or is 
overbroad in its characterization of the deadline to file a notice of appeal as 
jurisdictional. 147 The cases cited by Bowles either did not address time limits for appeals 
or could have been decided by characterizing the time limit as mandatory rather than 
jurisdictionai. 148 Had Bowles held the time limit to be mandatory as well, it would have 
been entirely consistent with that precedent. 
Several of those cases did state that the time limit is "jurisdictional," but, as I have 
explained, those characterizations were unnecessary, 149 and nothing required the Court 
to adhere to that dicta. Indeed, in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the Court 
dispensed with a long tradition of calling the deadline for filing a Title VII suit 
jurisdictional when the precise holdings of precedent did not tum on that 
characterization. 150 Similarly, in Arbaugh, the Court acknowledged prior opinions 
characterizing Title VII's definitions as "jurisdictional"151 but refused to follow that 
characterization because the "decision did not tum on that characterization, and the 
parties did not cross swords over it."152 Finally, in Eberhart, the Court distinguished 
Robinson-which had characterized the time to file a criminal appeal as "mandatory and 
jurisdictional"153-as a decision merely invoking the mandatory and inflexible nature of 
the rule. Eberhart interpreted Robinson's phrase "mandatory and jurisdictional" to mean 
emphatically mandatory. 154 Zipes, Arbaugh, Eberhart and other cases155 demonstrate 
that it would have been entirely appropriate for Bowles to give less deference to the 
precedent that it cited. 
In addition, a mandatory but nonjurisdictional characterization would have been 
more consistent with the more recent cases of Kontrick, Eberhart, Scarborough, and 
Arbaugh. Indeed, Eberhart itself construed the deadline at issue there to be mandatory, 
stating that courts "may not extend the time to take any action under [the rule] ... except 
as stated [in it]."156 Kontrick also classified the rule at issue in that case as an 
apply nonjurisdictional rules with rigidity and decide, for example, that even if a particular rule is 
non jurisdictional, it still cannot be waived."). 
147. See supra text accompanying nn. 46-83. 
148. See supra text accompanying nn. 46-83. 
149. See supra text accompanying nn. 58-83. 
150. 455 u.s. 385,395 (1982). 
151. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 512 (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,249 (1991)). 
152. Jd. at 512. 
153. Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 17 (citing Robinson, 361 U.S. at 229). 
154. /d.atl7-18. 
155. See e.g. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env., 523 U.S. 83,91 (1998) (declining to follow a decision 
characterizing a limit as jurisdictional because the case did not tum on it). 
156. 546 U.S. at 15 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(2)). 
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"inflexible" rule "unalterable on a party's application, [that] can nonetheless be forfeited 
if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point."157 
Because a mandatory characterization would have comported with the more recent 
attempts to take care with the jurisdictional label and, at the same time, would not have 
broken from past cases using the moniker "mandatory and jurisdictional" unthinkingly, 
Bowles should have charted the middle course. By failing to do so, Bowles has 
compounded the doctrinal confusion onjurisdictionality. 
2. A Narrower Decision 
In addition to being more consistent with precedent, a mandatory characterization 
would have been the narrowest basis for decision in Bowles. Bowles would have come 
out exactly the same as it did if the Court had found the time limit to file an appeal to be 
mandatory but nonjurisdictional. Bowles's appeal was late, and the state timely and 
properly raised the deadline in its appellate brief. 158 Thus, the only question was 
whether the deadline was subject to Bowles's equitable excuse of reliance upon the 
district court's order. By definition, a mandatory rule is not subject to such an equitable 
exception. Thus, Bowles's appeal was properly dismissed by the court of appeals. 
Characterizing the deadline as mandatory would have been the narrowest decision 
for the Court. In fact, because both jurisdictional and some nonjurisdictional rules alike 
are mandatory, the Court need not have resolved the jurisdictional character of the 
deadline at all. By deciding instead the blunter issue of jurisdictionality, Bowles did 
resolve the deadline's mandatory nature, but it logically also decided the deadline's 
invulnerability to waiver, forfeiture, and consent, and obligated lower courts to raise and 
police compliance sua sponte. If the deadline was mandatory, Bowles had no reason to 
go further to call it jurisdictional as well. 
Indeed, the Court previously has resolved the mandatory character of a rule 
without speaking to the broader jurisdictional nature if the mandatory characterization 
will resolve the case more narrowly. In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 159 individuals 
sued a county for alleged violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA), which requires plaintiffs to notify the alleged violator, the state, and the EPA at 
least sixty days prior to commencing suit. 160 The plaintiffs failed to comply with the 
notification requirement, and the defendant moved for summary judgment on that basis. 
The plaintiffs then immediately notified the appropriate authorities and, when it became 
clear that neither they nor the defendant had any intention of taking remedial action, 
argued that its original noncompliance should be deemed to be cured. 161 
The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the requirement to 
157. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456. To be accurate, the Court did not hold the rule to be mandatory as in being 
impervious to equitable excuses, id. at 457, but its treatment of the rule as forfeitable yet unalterable on a 
party's application is consistent with a mandatory characterization. 
158. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2362. 
159. 493 u.s. 20 (1989). 
160. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l). 
161. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 23-24. 
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be jurisdictionai. 162 The Supreme Court affirmed, though on different grounds. The 
Court concluded that the statute was mandatory and did not allow for the kind of excuse 
that the plaintiffs sought. 163 Importantly, however, the Supreme Court declined to 
decide whether the rule was jurisdictional or not, despite the fact that the Ninth Circuit 
had so decided, that the parties had argued it, and that the question presented asked that 
exact question. Instead, the Court put it this way: 
Therefore, we hold that the notice and 60-day delay requirements are mandatory conditions 
precedent to commencing suit under the RCRA citizen suit provision; a district court may 
not disregard these requirements at its discretion. The parties have framed the question 
presented in this case as whether the notice provision is jurisdictional or procedural. In 
light of our literal interpretation of the statutory requirement, we need not determine 
whether [RCRA] is jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term. 164 
Thus, the Court decided the case on the narrower ground of whether the rule was 
mandatory, rather than determining whether it was jurisdictionai. 165 
Hallstrom is a model for what Bowles should have considered doing. Rather than 
begin with the blunter characterization of jurisdictional and let the mandatory nature 
"follow naturally" 166 from that, Bowles should have decided the narrower ground of 
whether the rule was mandatory first. Deciding that question in the affirmative would 
have obviated the need to address the more complicated issue of jurisdictionality. 167 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 
In light of the failure of Bowles and its missed opportunity to fashion a narrower 
and more consistent approach, it is no surprise that litigants and lower courts have cited 
Bowles for a variety of confusing propositions. 
The Tenth Circuit, for example, has applied Bowles to the time to file a notice of 
appeal from a criminal sentence based principally on Bowles's statements that the time to 
file a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. 168 Several courts have interpreted Bowles as 
calling into question the availability of equitable tolling to the one-year statute of 
limitations for habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 169 Finally, at least 
162. !d. at 24-25. 
163. !d. at 25-31. 
164. !d. at 31. 
165. Cf id. at 34 n. *(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
As there is no dispute in this case that respondent timely raised the claim that petitioners had not 
complied with the notice provision, the question whether a defendant may waive the notice 
requirement is not before the Court . . . . I do not understand the Court to express any view on 
whether the notice requirement is waivable. 
Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 34 n. *. 
166. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366. 
167. The Court recently engaged in a similar methodology in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 
128 S. Ct. 750 (2008), in which the Court declined to resolve the jurisdictionality of the limitations period of 
the Tucker Act and instead addressed the narrow issue presented by the facts, namely, whether a court of 
appeals could raise noncompliance sua sponte despite the government's waiver of the issue in the lower courts. 
!d. at 752. 
168. U.S. v. Smith, 238 Fed. Appx. 356,358-59 (lOth Cir. 2007) (unpublished). 
169. Enright v. Acton, 2007 WL 2225828 at *2 (D. Mont. July 30, 2007) (awarding a certificate of 
appealability on the issue); Howe v. Mahoney, 2007 WL 2159321 at *I (D. Mont. July 25, 2007). The 
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one litigant has argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that Bowles renders jurisdictional 
the thirty-day time period for an alien to file a petition for judicial review of a final order 
of removal. 170 
These developments are unsurprising in light of Bowles's errors, and my strong 
suspicion is that this is just the beginning. Bowles could have avoided such problems 
had the Court more carefully considered the consequences of its characterization and of 
the reasoning it used to get there. 
But all is not lost. A future Court may place Bowles where it belongs-alongside 
cases like Robinson, Torres, and Griggs, which characterized the time to file a notice of 
appeal as "mandatory and jurisdictional" but for which the narrow issue presented was 
whether the deadline was merely "mandatory." Doing so would bring principle and 
consistency back to the Court's jurisdictional characterization jurisprudence. 
Supreme Court has not decided whether equitable tolling applies to§ 2244. See e.g. Lawrence v. Fla., 127 S. 
Ct. I 079, I 085 (2007) ("We have not decided whether§ 2244 allows for equitable tolling."). 
170. Br. for the Res pt. in Opposition, Ndreca v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 2030540 at *4 (U.S. July 13, 2007) 
(arguing under Bowles that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(l) is jurisdictional). 
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